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CIRCUMSTANTIAL PROOF OF ANCIENT
DOCUMENTS
Every ancient document was once young. It was once
a day, a week, a month, a year old. Had there been necessity
to prove the execution of such document by the purporting
grantor in a deed, testator in a will, writer of some instrument other than a deed or will, a certain mode of proof
would be prescribed. Subscribing witnesses, if any, should
be called.
If they could not be commanded, the genuineness of their signatures should be proved. If such proof
were impracticable, testimony concerning the act of execution of the purporting executant or concerning an admission by him of its execution or testimony by those who recognize in the signature his hand-writing, should be given1
When a considerable time has elapsed since the execution of
the instrument, the difficulty of procuring such proof thereof, becomes great, and, at length it becomes impossible. As

Prof. Wigmore observes "After a long lapse of time, ordinary testimonial evidence from those who saw the docuMcGennis v. Allison, 10 S. & R. 197; Garwood v. Dennis, 4 Binn.
314, 326. As to the value of the rule with respect to ancient deeds,
see Dougherty v. Welshans, 233 Pa. 121, 134.
23 Wigmore Evid., p. 2899.
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ment's execution, or knew the style of hand-writing or heard
the party admit the execution, is practically unavailable,
and a necessity always exists for resorting to circumstantial evidence.
The nature of this circumstantial evidence has become, in process of time, more or less
clearly defined by the adjudications. The purpose of this
article is to state the doctrine of the Pennsylvania decisions
concerning the evidence peculiar to ancient documents.
When a Document is Ancient
At first, the exceptional mode of proving a document,
was allowed in cases in which it was "ancient," that word
receiving no precise definition. Then, as Wigmore shows,
by the 1700's the period of 40 -years was adopted as the necessary age. This, he observes, was too strict, because witnesses of a document were likely to be mature persons, at
about 30 years of age, and thirty more years would suffice
to bring them to the end of their life. Ever since the second half of the 18th century, he observes, "the period of
thirty years has sufficed to constitute an ancient document,
except under some special statutory rules."'3 In 1823, Duncan, J., said, "Thirty years seems the fixed time, a shorter
period twenty-five, perhaps 21, the period of limitation,
might be sufficient, but of this I give no opinion. It is not
the presumption of a fact, which would be for the consideration of the jury rather than the court, but as a general
maxim of law, and courts have therefore fixed a limitation
beyond which proof of the execution will not be required,
leaving it to the opposite side to dispute the execution by
calling the subscribing witness or any other witness."'4 In
a large number of cases, thirty years seems the age which
justifies characterizing a document as ancient; e. g. a deed ;Wigmore Evid., p. 2900.
4McGennis v. Allison, 10 S. & R. 197. The word twenty, in Williamas v. Hillegas, 5 Pa. 492, 494, is probably a misprint for thirty.
5
Ross v. Cutshall, 1 Binn. 399; Cable v. Cable, 146 Pa. 451; Arnold v. Gorr, 1 R. 223; Jackson v. Gunton, 26 Super. 203; James v.
Letzler, 8 W. & S. 192,
33
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articles of agreement ;6 an assignment of a right to land under certain warrant and survey7 a will," a power of attorney.9 A deed more than 50 years old, was characterized by
Duncan, J., as "a very ancient deed."' 1
In Everly v.
Stoner," the court remarked that it had been said in "one
case," that deeds only 25 or 30 years old might be received
without proof of genuineness.
An application for land,
having been assigned to Grayfield, 28 years and three
months ago, the court, remarking that it was a transfer of
a mere equitable interest (how could that matter?) said
"Let it be read if Grayfield (who had been released by his
transferee) makes the proof stated," i. e. of the genuineness
of the transfer to him. No pains had been taken to learn
whether the subscribing witness to the transfer was living
or dead.
At What Event Must Document Be 30 Years Old?
The rule admitting circumstantial evidence of genuineness of a document, is a rule of evidence under which the
trial proceeds.
The document must be 30 years old, not
when the suit commences; not at any earlier period, but
when the document is offered in evidence.12
Evidence of Living Witnesses
Although the rule dispensing with proof of the execution of a document 30 or more years old, was adopted on
account of the probability, in a large percentage of caseq
that subscribing or other witnesses to the signature of the
executant, or of the subscribing witness will after 30 years
be dead; a deed 30 years old may be received, the other con6Zeigler v. Houtz, 1 W. & S. 533; Shaller v. Brand, 6 Binn. 435;
Lau v. Mumma, 43 Pa. 267.
7Healy v. Moul, 5 S. & R. 181.
8
Shaller v. Brand, 6 Binney, 435.
9
Bowser v. Cravener, 56 Pa. 132.
0
McGennis v. Allison, 10 S. & R. 197.
112 Yeates, 122.
123 Wigmore Evid., p. 2901,
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ditions being present, without proof of its execution although there is evidence that there are still living witnesses. 13
Appearance of Genuineness
One of the qualities which a document is said to need,
in order that its execution should be allowed to be found by
a jury without the ordinary kind of proof, is that it should
be "unblemished by any alterations. 14 It must have an appearance of antiquity, or be proved 30 years old, but in addition, it must have the "appearance of genuineness." An
article of agreement between A and B, whereby A agreed
that B might be the erection of a dam, flood a portion of
A's land, and that A would convey the portion thus flooded
to B for a certain price, purported to be signed by both
parties and by two subscribing witnesses. It bore a certificate of acknowledgment by A, and a minute written by the
Recorder of Deeds, that it had been recorded in a certain
book. The recorder, added "The foregoing appears not to
be an original but, might be copied from the original.
It
is a copy by Dr. Kling." The body of the agreement, thE
signatures, and the certificate of acknowledgment appeared
to be in one hand-writing and the same ink.
The recorder also stated, on the instrument "The name of Henry Miller (one of the two subscribing witnesses) is not General
Miller's writing." The instrument was dated 20th July,
1773. It was recorded 19th Sept., 1803. The trial was in
1861. Says Lowrie, C. J., "The state of the paper and of its
record must have been known to the plaintiff and his predecessors in the title of the mill property, and considering
that they had a right to demand its record without note
or comment by the recorder, if he was satisfied of the genuineness of the certificate of acknowledgment, and yet accepted the record with the above mentioned note of the
'sMcReynolds v. Longenecker, 57 Pa. 13, 31; McGennis v. Allison,
10 S. & R. 197.

'&McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 Pa. 13, 31.
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recorder who seems to have known the handwriting of some
of the persons named, we know not how we can say that -the
paper appeared to be genuine." The paper then, was not
entitled to reception without proof of its execution.1 s A
suit was brought against the executor of the surety in an
administration bond. The sole defense denied the genuineness of the surety's signature. The bond from its date appeared to be over 30 years old, and was produced from the
custody of the register of wills. It appeared to have been
cut from the bond book, and to have been pasted in again.
It was not witnessed nor approved by the register, at the
time of its execution. After its admission in evidence, one
of the subscribing witnesses testified that his signature to
it was not genuine. The court refused to tell the jury that
the burden was on the defendant to prove that the surety did
not sign the bond. The court refused to set aside a verdict
for the defendant. 1 6
The Proper Custody
Documents bestowing rights or immunities, are nor.
mally put into the possession of the person on whom they be.
stow these rights and immunities, and their privies.
It
would be a circumstance inimical to the hypothesis of genuineness, that a deed, contract, etc., was not delivered to
or retained by the party intended to receive the advantage
thereof, or his heirs, next of kin, assignees, grantees.
Hence, it is insisted that the document should be shown to
have been with the proper depositary. The grantee in a
deed is the proper custodian of it.17 The administrator of
the owner of land who has payed the taxes assessed on it,
and obtained receipts from the county treasurer therefor,
is a proper custodian of these receipts.18 A draft of land,
15 Lau v. Mumma, 43 Pa. 267. The instrument recorded, was apparently, a copy of an original.
1sYork Trust Etc. Co. v. Kindig, 7 York, 149.
17Scharff v. Keener, 64 Pa. 376.
ISMeReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 Pa. 13.
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a receipt to its owner for moneys due for it, a lease made by
him to another, had been in his custody. Unmarried, he
had lived at the house of a Mr. Blackfan. He there had a
drawer of a desk, containing these and other papers. Long
after his death, in 1760, the papers were found in the drawer. They were rightly admitted. 19 In Williams v. Hillegas, 20 possession of the deed by which title vested in plaintiff's ancestor, for upwards of 30 years by this ancestor in
an action of trespass q. e. f. was shown. The office of the
Surveyor-General was the proper depositary of surveys. A
draft of a deputy-surveyor, not found there, could not be
received as an ancient document. The Suveyor-General is
the proper keeper of such a paper, and a copy of it, certified
21
by him, would be receivable.
Possession of Thing Granted
The document may purport to convey certain rights or
immunities and, if genuine, the person on whom these
rights or immunities are conferred, would probably be found
to exercise or enjoy them.
The absence of such exercise
would be significant that .the party did not believe himself
to possess them, and therefore, that the document was not
genuine.
If the document is a deed surveying land, the
grantee, if it is a genuine deed, conferring a right to an
immediate possession, will take and retain possession. His
not taking and retaining it would cast some doubt on the
authenticity of the deed, unless there was direct evidence of
its genuineness, or the omission to take possession was explained. "It is," says Duncan, J., "the accompanying possession which establishes the authenticity of an ancient
deed. 2 2 "Although," thought Tilghman, C. J.32 "the anti19Lewis v. Lewis, 4 W. & S. 378. Huston, J., describes the documents as being found among the papers of the deceased after the
lapse of 100 years.
205 Pa. 492.
21
Rodgers v. Riddleburg Coal & Iron Co., 31 Leg. Int. 325.
22
McGennis v. Allison, 10 S. & R. 197.
2SShalder v. Brand, 6 Binn. 435. Cf. Ross v. Cutshall, 1 Binn.
399; Zeigler v. Houtz, 1 W. & S. 533, 538.
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quity of the writing (here a will) affords some evidence in
its favor, yet the main ingredient is possession (of the land
devised.) Both however are necessary to raise that presumption which will justify the Court in departing from the
usual rule, which requires the production of the subscribing witnesses or proof of their hand-writing, after accounting for their absence." Two deeds poll were offered in evidence, one dated Aug. 15th, 1766, and another endorsed
thereon, from the grantee therein to R. L., dated June 8th,
1776. In a trial in ejectment in 1828, they were properly
rejected, says Smith, J., because "they had not accompanied the possession, and therefore do not come within the rule
familiar to all which permits ancient deeds, which have
come along with, and accompanied the possession, to be
'
given in evidence without proof of their execution.' 24
Length of the Possession
It can hardly be necessary to prove that the possession
has continued through the whole period that has elapsed
since the date of the deed. If at various intervals within
that time, a possession is shown by the party who under
the deed if genuine would be entitled to the possession
and no possession is shown in another, except in subservience to him, the proof of possession should be sufficient.
Occasionally however, language is used by the judges which
seems to hold that a possession for 30 years, must be shown.
The trial court told the jury25 that unless they should believe
that possession had gone according to devise in a will (whose
execution had not been proved in the normal way,) "for upwards of 30 years, they should pay no regard to it." Respecting four assignments of the right title and interest in
a survey, Duncan, J., said, "As possession accompanied these
transfers for a term exceeding 30 years, they prove them24

Arnold v. Gorr, 1 R. 223. In Bowser v. Cravener, 56 Pa. 132.
Thompson, C. J., says a deed 30 years old under some circumstances
proves itself; "certainly it does where there is possession under it."
25
Shaller v. Brand, 6 Binn. 436.
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selves.
The antiquity and the corresponding possession
authenticity."28
them
give
When Deed Postpones Right of Possession
Sometimes the deed bestows a right to a future possession only. E. g., a deed, made in 1843, reserved a life estate to the grantor. He died in Nov., 1889, retaining possession until then. In an ejectment commenced in Feb.,
1890, Mitchell, J., observes, "The deed was made in 1843,
and was more than thirty years old when offered in evidence. It was therefore an ancient deed, and probably entitled to the presumption of due execution, though what
circumstances will obviate the necessity of concurrent possession of the land, may be regarded as not entirely settled.' '27 A will proved in 1799, gave a life estate to A, who
lived until 1851, with remainder to B. A deed made in 1827
by one who claimed the land under B conveyed it to D. On
the death of A, D took possession and continued it until
1865, (fourteen years) when a trespass was committed. In
an action of trespass q. c. f., it was held that this deed proved
itself.
"The life-tenant's possession was consistent with
the estate in remainder, and in privity with it, the actual
possession taken at the earliest moment after the expiration
of the life estate, and held by the party entitled to the possession, while the defendants were strangers to the plaintiff's line of title.28 A died in 1834, having made a will
March 7th, 1832. He devised a life estate to his wife, but
imposed duties on a son William, to look after her, duties
which required him to live on the premises with her. The
other children executed a deed to William, prior to A's death,
of their interests in their father's (A's) property, in consideration of his agreeing to remain with and take care of
26

Healy v. Moul, 5 S. & It. 181; Zeigler v. Houtz, 1 W. & S. 533,

538.

27

Cable v. Cable, 146 Pa. 451.
28Scharff v. Keener, 64 Pa. 376.
of the deed, is condemed.

The rejection by the trial court,
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A's wife. One of the brothers, Andrew, denying that he had
executed the deed, brought ejectment in 1867. The widow
died in 1846. William proved that he had retained possession after her death; had built a house on the premises;
that Andrew, the plaintiff, had lived a few miles from the
premises; to which he had made no claim, until the discovery of coal thereon, and that the land had been assessed
from 1835 to 1869 in the name of William. Says Williams,
J., approving of the admission of the deed, "If genuine, it
conveyed no present estate or immediate right of possession; and no actual or exclusive possession could have been
taken under it until the death of Margaret Walker (the
widow) in 1846, to whom a life-estate was given by the will
of Robert Walker (A.) But if the defendant did not have
the exclusive possession of the land, he had such possession
of it for more than 30 years as the parties to the deed intended that he should have, and why should not this, in conneetion with the other corroborating circumstances in evidence, be sufficient to raise the presumption of its genuine.
ness without express proof of its execution? The deed required the defendant to remain with Robert Walker (his
father) who was living on the land, and the owner of it,
during his lifetime, and to take care of him and manage his
29
estate in a proper manner.
Exercising Rights Within Another's Land
Articles of agreement between A and B purported to
give B the right to erect a dam which would exceed 3 feet
in height, provided that it did not cause the overflow of
29

Walker v. Walker, 67 Pa. 185.

A deed was produced, bearing

a date 63 years ago; and appearing to be ancient

One of the sub-

scribing witnesses was dead. The other was not known. Possession
had not attended the deed. The only evidence was by one who said
he had well known one of the witnesses and had seen many deeds and
papers signed by him, and he believed his name to this deed to be in
his hand-writing, but he had never seen him write. The court thought

this sufficient proof of the deed, considering its antiquity. Thomas
v. Horlocker, 1 Dall. 14.
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more than three acres of A's land, and to bind A to convey
to B the land thus overflowed, if B should demand the conveyance. The articles had an appearance of antiquity. It
was held that they did not have the appearance of genuineness. Another requisite to their being received in evidence
without the usual proof of genuineness was that they should
be corroborated by acts of the parties corresponding to the
claim now made under them. The recent act of flooding in
1850 for which the suit was brought, could not be used to
corroborate the genuineness of the articles. The flooding
that existed for 75 years prior to 1850, would justify the
presumption of a grant of a right to flood so much, and
would be corroborative of any grant which appeared to be
genuine, which would authorize such, so much, flooding.
But the actual flooding of the 75 years prior to 1850, could
not possibly corroborate a claim for further flooding since
that time. "If this agreement," says Lowrie, C. J., "means
that the defendant may increase the height of his dam beyond what it stood at for 75 years, then and thus far it has
3
no corroborative acts in support of its genuineness.1 0

Unseated Land
In the case of unseated land, the payment of taxes
seems to be an equivalent of the taking of possession. Land
was warranted and surveyed in the name of Henry Kepple,
in 1773. During the 70 years that had elapsed since 1773,
nothing of Kepple has been heard, while those under whom
the plaintiff claimed the land, and he, paid all the taxes that
had been assessed on the land, viz. from 1805 till the trial.
This said Gibson, C. J., was the exercise of the only ownership over the warrant, of which, as a titie to wild land, it
was susceptible. Although no deed from Kepple purporting
to convey his interest, was alleged to have existed, "surely,
if the beneficial ownership had been in Kepple, he or his
3OLau v. Mumma, 43 Pe. 267.

8ITaylor v. Dougherty, 1 W. & S. 324.
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representatives would have claimed it long before." "Now
certainly," argues Bell, J., "that which is of sufficient vigor
to originate the presumption of a conveyance not produced,
may well be accepted to authenticate a deed in existence, and
accordant with a fact proved (the assessment of taxes, in
the name of the grantee therein, and those claiming under
him, and the payment thereof by these persons) equivalent
to actual possession.
So viewed, it is brought within the
most stringent rule of evidence, requiring possession to accompany the deed.3 1 Survey for Mehaffy under an application in 1767. A deed, purporting to be by Mahaffy to
Ormsby prior to 1770, was offered. A judgment had been
recovered against Ormsby in 1770 under which the land in
question was sold by the sheriff in 1773 to the father of the
plaintiff, (trespass q. c. f.)
Taxes assessed on the land
have been paid ever since 1805, by the father of the plaintiff and by himself. (The trial was in 1845). "Surely,"
says Bell, J., "this ought to have been received as affording
a foundation on which to rest the deed offered in evidence,3 2 on which to admit it in evidence.
As Against Defendants Claiming No Title
When an ejectment or action of trespass q. c. f. is
brought against one not asserting a title to the land, a less
stringent rule with respect to possession under a deed in
order to justify its reception without direct proof of its execution, seems to obtain. Payment of taxes on unseated land
for 30 years by one who appeared as grantee in a deed, and
by those who derived title from him, was held equivalent
to possession "against a mere intruder without shadow of
right." 33 Rice, P. J., quoting from Halsey v. Blood, 29 Pa.
319, the sentiment "A wrongdoer without title, who endeavors to protect his trespass by the outstanding title of a
stranger, has no equity, and is not entitled to any particu"2Williams

v. Hillegas, 5 Pa. 492. The action was trespass q. c. f.
against one not claiming a title.
33
Williams v. Hillegas, 5 Pa. 492.
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lar favor," holds a deed admissible, under the following circumstances. Samuel M. Fox held a title to land and by a
declaration of trust, executed in 1798, acknowledged that
he held the land for George Fox, Joseph P. Norris, and the
devisees of Roberts. A deed by Joseph M. Fox, dated April
6th, 1816, to Joseph P. Norris and Hugh Roberts, recited
that the grantor was the oldest son and heir at law of Samuel M. Fox. This deed was 87 years old, and had been recorded 50 years before the trial. So far as appears, none
of the parties or their privies had asserted title otherwise
than through the declaration of trust and the deed (which
was made to carry the trust into effect).
The deed was
held sufficiently authenticated, as "against a trespasser
without even color of title to the portion of land covered by
the deed, upon which the trespass was committed."'s
Title to Land Undisputed
The title to land may be unquestioned, except for an
alleged sale of it for unpaid taxes. The validity of this sale
will depend on the payment, before it, of the taxes. The
treasurer's receipts for the taxes, are evidence of payment
of them. Instruments which purport to be receipts of the
treasurer, will, if ancient and in the possession of the person who would normally have them, if they were genuine.
be received, without proof that they were made by the person by whom they purport to have been made, or that such
person was, at the time of their execution, the treasurer,
or that the payment of which they acknowledge
the receipt, was in fact made. In an ejectment, plaintiff
claimed under a tax sale, against the person who would be
the owner, if the sale was invalid. The sale was for taxes
assessed in the years 1816 to 1822. The title to the land,
was traced to Henry Bower, who died in 1838.
The Orphans' Court ordered a sale of his interest in 1842. The
administrator testified that hearing that there had been
a tax sale, he exainined the deeds and other papers of Henry
34Jackson v. Gunton, 26 Super. 203.

Trespass q. c. f.
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Bower pertaining to his lands which were all in one bundle. Although, so far as appears, there was no actual possession of the land by Bower, or his heirs, the age of the
receipts, coupled with the fact that they had been in the
custody of persons who would be apt to have them, if genuine, was sufficient evidence of their genuineness. Receipts
of a county treasurer, are always provable without calling
the treasurer, and after they have become ancient, any other
proof that they were issued by him than that of their being in appropriate custody, is unnecessary. They are "evi'3 5
dence per se.
Kinds of Documents, Deeds
The antiquity of documents, with other circumstances,
their being apparently genuine, their having been wth the
appropriate depositary, the assertion of rights secured by
them, if genuine, are considerations applicable to the proof
of the genuineness of a variety of documents.
A usual
0 36
sort are deeds for land, deeds poll
or indentures, the release between Lord Baltimore and Thomas and Richard
Penn, determining boundaries between Pennsylvania and
Maryland,3 7 a deed to trustee, for certain persons, but re3
serving to the grantor a life estate.
List of First Purchasers,Etc.
The list of first purchasers of lands around Philadelphia found in the office of the proprietary, and later of the
surveyor general, has been put in evidence, without proof
of its execution by any particular person,3 9 as has also, a
copy of this list, furnished by the surveyor-general. 40 A
.IsMcReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 Pa. 13.

•6Arnold v. Gorr, 1 R. 223.
: ?Ross v. Cutshall, 1 Binn. 399; Scharff v. Keener, 64 Pa. 376;
Williams v. Hillegas, 5 Pa. 492; Walker v. Walker, 67 Pa. 185.
' Cable v. Cable, 146 Pa. 451.

• Hurst v. Dippo, 1 Dall. 20; Com. v. Alburger, 1 Whart. 469;
Kingston v. Lesley, 10 S. & R. 387.

4OMorris v. Vanderen, 1 Dall. 64; Com. v. Alburger, 1 Whart. 469.
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paper, certified by the surveyor-general to be a true copy
of a list of the first grantees or renters from the proprietaries, found in book No. 31 in his office, was received in
evidence without proof as to who executed it or of the truth
of its contents. 4 1 "The book," says Tilghman, C. J., "which
contains the list in question, is among the public books preserved in the land office, and the list itself, it must be presumed, was made out from ancient papers, many of which
It may be
may now be lost, or perhaps not in existence.
presumed too, that it was made out, as a matter of public
convenience, and not with a view to private evidence.42
Lease, Letters, Etc.
A lease, purporting to be executed by X and found
among his papers after his death, may be received as genuine, after it becomes ancient:43 Letters are mentioned, as
capable of being proved genuine, by lapse of time, etc.,4 as
is a bond 45 an assignment of a warrant and survey,4 6 a power
of attorney4 7 articles of agreement to convey land. 48
Maps
A certified copy of a plan or map of the city of Philadelphia purporting to have been made in 1683 called "A
portraiture of the City of Philadelphia, by Thomas Holme,
Surveyor General," was received in evidence, Sergeant, J.
saying, "it was undoubtedly evidence (in 1836) being a copy
of an official paper on file in the proper place, of great
antiquity and public importance."4 9 A map 60 years old
4"Kingston v. Lesley, 10 S. & R. 383.
4210 S. & R. 383.

43Lewis v. Lewis, 4 W. & S. 378.
-McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 Pa. 13.
45York, Etc. Co. v. Kindig, 7 York 149.
4
6Healy v. Moul, 5 S. & R. 181.
' TBowser v. Cravener, 56 Pa. 132.
48Lau v. Mumma, 43 Pa. 267; Zeigler v. Houtz, 1 W. & S. 533.
49Com. v. Alburger, 1 Wh. 469; Smucker v. Penna. R. R. 188 Pa.
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showing an appropriation by the state for a canal, of land
along the Juniata river in Huntingdon, and found in the
files in the proper office at Harrisburg, in a book entitled
"Plan Book No. 23 of Public Works," in the very custody
and place it should have been was receivable without showing that it was framed and filed at the exact time the state
entered upon the land, of which the map purports to exhibit the boundary. The evidence showed that the map was
made, either while the work of constructing the canal was
progressing, or about the time of its completion, and was
intended to show the boundaries of the state's appropriation.50 The Campbell warrant was issued a year before
the warrnt to the Holland Land Co. The location of the
ground of the Campbell warrant was indisputable. As an
admission by the Holland Land Co. that the land in dispute
(in ejectment) was embraced in the Campbell warrant and
survey, the general map or draft of the land in three counties
of the Holland Company was received, and properly, not
only because it was the company's draft, and in use by it
(under whom the defendants claim) but because "being ancient, and long in use, it was evidence of boundary upon
the principle of an admission by the company."5' 1
In an ejectment, plaintiff offered a map made about
30 years ago, by one Zimmerman. The map had been made
by Zimmerman at the request of the people of Germantown.
As it was not paid for, Zimmerman retained it. It contained the lines of the Germantown lots, and the adjacent outlots. In cases of difference, the map generally determined
disputes about lines. The defendant, at first objecting,
He subsequently
agreed to the introduction of the map.
objected to allowing it to go out with the jury. The court
declared it was not proper evidence; that it should not have

GoSmucker v. Penna. R. R., 188 Pa. 40.
5'Huffman v. McCrea, 56 Pa. 95. The draft was seen by a witness in

1836. The ejectment was brought in 1857. When the trial occurred
is not apparent. The case was in the Supreme Court in 1867.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

138

been admitted; and refused to permit it to be taken out by
the jury52
Receipts
A receipt over 100 years old, given by guardians of a
minor, to her brother, for moneys payable by him, as devisee of land to his sisters was put in evidence in an ejectment.. Being found among his papers after the lapse of
100 years, or even of one-fourth of that time, says Huston,
J., it was evidence of his right to the land.5 3 Company A,
plaintiff in an ejectment, had succeeded to Company B. The
plaintiff offered five checks drawn by the president of the
B company, having dates ranging from April 30th, 1793 to
Feb. 8th, 1797, in favor of Johnson & Napier, contractors,
to dig the canal, and receipted by them. The checks and
receipts being 50 years old and produced from the archives
of the company or its treasurer, and evidence being given
that Johnson & Napier had contracted for the work, and
the work had been done, the receipts were admissible without proof of the signatures of Johnson & NapierA4 In an
ejectment tried probably in 1840, the plaintiff attempted to
prove that John Christ had paid the Receiver General of the
Land Office, a certain sum of money. A receipt purporting to issue from the Receiver General's office, dated May
25th, 1792, and signed Fras. Johnson, R. G., was offered in
evidence.
Objection being made to it, a witness for the
plaintiff said he knew the hand-writing of Francis Johnson and his son. The son did nearly all the business. The
signature to the receipt was probably the writing of the son.
Objection to the receipt was that the authority of the son
to issue it, as the receipt of the Receiver General, did not
appear. Kennedy, J., observes "After so great a lapse of
time, any slight evidence would have been sufficient to have
justified the court in leaving it to the jury as a question of
52

Biddle v. Shippen, 1 Dall. 19.

53
5

Lewis.v. Lewis, 4 W. & S. 378.
Union Canal Co. v. Lloyd, 4 W. & S. 393.
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fact to be decided by them, whether it was a receipt given
under the authority of the Receiver General of the Land
Office or not.55 Thompson, C. J., expressed in 1868, a doubt
without deciding, whether receipts of a private nature were
provable by antiquity, coming from the proper repository
etc. He regarded a receipt for taxes, issued by the county
treasurer, or any receipt of a public officer, as so prova58
ble.
Wills
As deeds, so wills may be proven to be the wills of the
purporting testators, by their antiquity, their appearance of
genuineness, their having been in the proper depository, and
by the assertion of claims in conformity therewith. "There
is no doubt," said Tilghman, C. J., "but that ancient deeds
under which possession has gone for thirty years are evidence without proof of their execution, and it was decided
in Jackson v. Blanshan, 3 Johns. 292, that in similar circumstances, a will also was evidence57
Survey
Action in which the boundaries of a tract were disputed. A paper, purporting to be a survey of the land was admitted in evidence as an ancient document, though it was
not produced from the custody of the surveyor-general. It
was error to receive it, since it did not come from the proper
custody. 8 In an ejectment, defendants sought by ancient
documents and notes of surveys to corroborate the lines
adopted by their surveyors by work done on the ground not
long before the trial. The court without error, ruled that
they were admissible, and advised the jury to carefully
scrutinize them, and unless they found them genuine and
of the ages claimed for them, to give them no weight in lo55
Urket v. Coryell, 5 W. & S. 60. The evidence of authority was
found to be abundant.
58
McReynolds v. Longenberger, 57 Pa. 13.
5T
Shaller v. Brand, 6 Binn 435.
5sRodgers v. Riddleburg Coal & Iron -Co., 31 Leg. Int. 325.
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cating the line; to assist in locating which they were introduced. "The value of the oral testimony might largely,"
says the supreme court, "if not wholly depend on the genuineness of the documents and their dates."''5
Destruction of Ancient Document
A well known rule of evidence is that when a writing
is once shown to have existed, and to have been lost or destroyed, secondary evidence of its contents, after proof of
its genuineness will be received. At what time must the
age of the instrument be considered, in order to admit proof
of its contents? At the time of its destruction, or at the
time of the offer of the secondary evidence? If a deed,
ten years old, was destroyed 30 years ago, will its contents
be provable, if possession compared the deed, during its
existence, and has continued since, in those who, it being
genuine, would be entitled to the possession? No answer
to this question can be derived from the decisions of thistate. In McReynolds v. Longenberger, 60 receipts for taxes
on unseated land issued by a county treasurer, were seen
by a witness when they were more than 30 years old, with a
depositary with whom they would, if genuine, likely be
They were subsequently destroyed, in the burning of the
house in which they had been. That their contents could
be proved by the witness and their genuineness be assumed,
is held by the supreme court. "Here," says Thompson, C.
J, "if the witness is accurate, these receipts were, at the
time of their destruction, within the category of ancient
documents, purporting to be over 30 years old, and evidence
poer se. They were in the possession of the proper custodian
of the papers; derived from the owner of the estate, who,
while in his custody, (the administrator of the deceased
owner) offered the land in pursuance of an order of the
Orphans' Court for sale, on the faith of them. (i. e. assum5OWilson v. Rulofson, 201 Pa. 29.
6057 Pa. 13.
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ing the receipts to be proof that the taxes had been paid,
and the sale of the land, as for unpaid taxes, void.) When
the witness was called to testify, had the receipts been
present, they would have been long past 30 years old, and
would, under the authority of the cases cited, have spoken
for themselves; no legal presumption of the existence of
any writings to prove anything about them existing. That
presumption arises at 30 years, and it is on this ground
that papers prove themselves. Was it not therefore competent to prove the destruction of what was at the time of
the destruction, testimony (sic) per se, and supply contentv
by secondary evidence.'161 Is it not difficult to see how the
fact that the receipts were 30 years old, when they were destroyed, can have any relevancy? If they once existed, if
they continued in the proper custody, until they were destroyed, if rights and obligations (e. g. that of paying the
taxes) were asserted and recognized, both before and after
their destruction, why should they not be assumed to have
been signed by the treasurer, although only a fraction of
the 30 years had elapsed when they were destroyed?
61
The witness did not need to remember by whom the tax receipt
purported to be signed, nor know that the signature was genuine, nor
remember the amounts of taxes paid, nor know that the signers were
treasurers of the county.
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MOOT COURT
NATIONAL BANK v. SOLWAY
Negotiable Instruments-Fraud-Holder's Knowledge of InfirmityProof-Act May 16, 1901. P. L. 202
HOLTZMAN, J. X induced the defendant to execute a negotiable note to him for $300.00. The note was discounted by the plaintiff before maturity. This action is brought to recover the amount
of the note from the maker.
Solway defended by alleging fraud
practiced upon him, and supported the defense by the testimony of
three witnesses. The Bank then called its cashier, a director, and
two other directors, to prove it was a bona fide holder without know]edge of the fraud; these had attended the meeting of the directors
at which the action of the cashier in discounting the note had been
ratified.
Fraud and the knowledge of the fraud are questions of fact for
the jury. The question in this case is whether or not the bank had
knowledge of the fraud, and if it had no such knowledge whether or
not it showed the want of it by calling only three of its directors, five
constituting their board. The court below held that all of the directors should have been called, that knowledge by any one or two of
them would preclude the bank's recovering.
In this ease the jury weighed the evidence and rendered a verdict for the defendant.
They heard the conflicting testimony and decided according to
their sound judgment for the defendant, and since it was an establishment of a fact within the exclusive province of the jury, the
court had no right to hold that the evidence was not sufficient either
way. When the establishment of a question of fact depends upon
oral testimony, the credibility of the -witnesses is for the jury alone
and it is their exclusive province to determine whether from such
testimony the fact in dispute has been established.
Second Nat.
Bank v. Hoffman, 229 Pa. 429 (1910); Lonzer v. Lehigh Valley Bank,
196 Pa. 610.
In the case of National Bank of Coatesville v. Palmer, 56 Sup.
82 (1914), a case almost identical as to facts and law to the one
at hand, the court held, "It is not necessary for the bank to call every
officer in any way connected with the administration of affairs
through whom some knowledge of the defect of the delivery of the
note might have been brought home to the bank." In that case the
plaintiff's case was slightly strengthened by the defendant's admission that he had no knowledge of the fraud until long after the note
had been discounted, which corroborated the plaintiff's proof of be-
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ing a bona fide holder for value without notice. This admission,
however, was not essential to the decision for the plaintiff. If the
jury believe beyond a reasonable doubt the testimony of one of the
plaintiff's witnesses as against three or four of the defendant's, it
is within their province and duty to hold according to their beliefs.
In the case at hand they believed the testimony of the defendant and
rendered a verdict in his favor. In the one case the fact of knowledge of the fraud is established by the jury in the other not, and
we have to apply the law accordingly.
Since the verdict was based on the erroneous instruction of the
court that all of the directors should have been called, that knowledge
by any one or two of them would preclude the bank's recovering, a
motion for a new trial should be granted. Where the cause has been
prejudiced for some misconception of the judge, a new trial should
be allowed. Trubat & Haley, Practice, Vol. II, p. 995; Daniels v. Wilton, 28 C. C. 526.
But aside from this error of the court, the verdict of the jury
establishes the fact of fraud and knowledge of it, and according to
the fact as found, the law must be applied. If the jury believe the
bank had knowledge or no knowledge of the fraud, judgment must
follow for plaintiff or defendant accordingly. The bank had sufficiently proved that it was a bona fide holder without notice. It was
incumbent on the defendant to call the two directors not called by
The
the plaintiff, and prove knowledge on the part of the bank.
verdict having been misdirected, a new trial is ordered. Judgment
for the plaintiff should be the result.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The fifty-eighth section of the act of May 16, 1901, P. L. 202,
provides that every holder is deemed, prima facie, to be a holder in
due course; but when it is shown that the title of any person who
has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on the
holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims acquired title as a holder in due course. Evidence was introduced in
this case which tended to show that the title of X, by whom the instrument was negotiated to the bank, was defective. Under section
fifty-eight, this placed upon the bank the burden of proving that it
was a holder in due course.
A holder in due course is a holder who has taken the instrument
under the following conditions: (1) That it is complete and regular
upon its face; (2) That he became the holder of it before it became
due, etc.; (3) That he took it in good faith and for value; (4) That
at the time it was negotiated to him -he had no notice of any infirm.
ity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating
it. See. 52, Act May 16, 1901, P. L. 202.
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The defendant claims that the plaintiff has'not sufficiently established the existence of the fourth condition because all of the
directors were not called to testify that they had no notice of any
infirmity or defect in X's title.
To this contention we cannot give our assent. Such a doctrine
would be both inconvenient and useless. To require the bank to summon all of its directors would, in many cases, subject the bank and
its directors to great inconvenience and would serve no useful purpose. The knowledge of bank directors of the business of the bank
is almost entirely gained at the directors' meeting. What one learns
the others who attended also learn. When three directors who attended the meeting -which ratified the action of the cashier, testify
that they had no knowledge of any defect in the instrument, and
there is nothing to show that the other directors had superior opportunities for gaining knowledge, the utility of calling the others is
not apparent. The cashier conducted the negotiations which resulted
in the purchase of the note. His opportunity for gaining knowledge
was greater than that of any of the directors and he has testified.
Judgment affirmed.
FRALEY v. RAILROAD CO.
Negligence-Contributory Negligence-Evidence--Habit
STATEMENT OF FACTS
John Fraley in attempting to cross with horse and buggy, the
tracks of the defendant, was run into by an oncoming train, and
killed. The situation of the crossing was such that one looking and
listening would have been aware of the approaching train, unless a
snow storm then raging made sight impossible. The plaintiff, widow
of Fraley, offered to show that Fraley often crossed the tracks at
this place, and always with the greatest circumspection. The court
rejected the evidence and the verdict was for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
WISE, J. The question to he decided in this case is whether
character evidence of conduct on similar occasions is admissible to
show conduct on one occasion. Widow Fraley tried to prove that
Fraley exercised caution on this particular occasion by showing that
he used the greatest circumspection on former occasions.
According to Trickett on Character Evidence in Civil Cases this
evidence is inadmissible. He says, "If a right to recover against A
rests on the presence or absence of habitual carefulness in B, the
absence of this carefulness can be proven by reputation, and not by
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special acts of carefulness." If the absence of habitual carefulness
cannot be proved by special acts, it would not be just and equitable
to permit the presence of habitual carefulness to be proven by special
acts. Widow Fraley did not attempt to prove her deceased husband's
reputation for carefulness, but tried to show that he had been careful on former occasions. Dean Trickett continues, "The character
for care can be proven only by the reputation for it and not by special
acts. Character grows out of special acts, but is not proved by them.
Special acts very often indicate frailties or vices that are altogether
contrary to the character already established."
In Baker v. Irish, 172 Pa. 528, Justice Dean held it proper to exclude evidence that the plaintiff had made a practice of jumping
from an elevator while in motion. He also says, "Where the question in suit against Railroad Company is whether a driver on a par
ticular occasion was negligent, it is irrelevant to prove that he had
been negligent on other occasions." In both instances justice Dean
held that it was proper to exclude evidence of conduct by special
acts. While in the former cases it was the defendant who tried to
prove the carelessness of the person injured and in this case plaintiff
tried to prove the care exercised by the injured one, we fail to see
where that makes any difference. It would work great hardship to
permit one party to introduce the evidence and not to allow the
other. All the evidence is of character on special occasions, and ac
cordingly should not be admitted. We fail to see where there was
error in admitting the evidence, and the motion for a new trial is accordingly denied.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
There is a presumption that every man is, on a particular occasion, careful. The burden is not put, in Pennsylvania, on a plaintiff
suing for a personal injury, to prove that he was free from contributory negligence. Was this presumption of care rebutted in this
case-?
One looking and listening would have been aware of the approaching train, in ordinary cases. Hence, in such cases, it might
be inferred from the collision, that the deceased did not look and
listen, or, if he did, that he recklessly ventured on the track, with
knowledge that the train was approaching.
But a snow storm was raging at the time of the crossing, and the
evidence suggests that sight of the train might have been rendered
impossible. That being so, no inference could be safely made, from
the occurrence of the accident, that the deceased was careless in endeavoring to cross the track. The defendant being negligent in not
whistling, or slackening its speed, the plaintiff should have recovered,
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in the absence of sufficient evidence of contributing negligence of
the deceased.
There are many cases which hold that the habit of the deceased
with respect to care, may be shown, in the absence of direct evidence
thereupon. "Of the probative value of a person's habit or custom,
as showing the doing on a specific occasion, of the act which is the
subject of the habit or custom," says Wigmore, "there can be no
doubt. Every day's reasoning and experience make it clear enough."
1 Evid. p. 166.
In a recent case the supreme court of Iowa has
held, "In aid of the presumption that one killed by a train at a railroad crossing was exercising due care in approaching the crossing,
there being no ey6 witnesses, evidence of his general habit in using
such crossing is competent."
The same doctrine is held in New
Hampshire, Illinois, Indiana, California, Massachusetts.
The decisions of Pennsylvania do not accord with those of these
jurisdictions. In Baker v. Irish, 172 Pa. 528, in a case where the
major testimony was that the boy attempted to leave the elevator
while it was in motion, the boy only contradicting, the offer to show
his habit was excluded. We cannot say therefore that the learned
court below has committed an error in following that authority.
But, since the deceased is not shown to have been negligent, we
think there was an error in allowing the plaintiff to be defeated because admissible evidence was not offered that he was careful.
Judgment reversed.
COMMONWEALTH v. PAXSON
Evidence-Confidential

Communications - Husband and Wife-Act
May 23, 1887, P. L. 158

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Paxson is tried for the theft from X of a sum of money. A
police officer, without having a warrant, searched his house, and
found there a letter written by Paxson to his wife in which Paxson
said he had stolen $500 from X. The commonwealth is allowed by
the court to put this letter in evidence. Motion for new trial.
OPINION OF THE COURT
JOHNSON, J. The counsel for the defendant confines his reas.
ons for a new trial to three points, namely: (1) Neither husband nor
wife are competent to testify as to confidential disclosures made by
one to the other. (2) This letter is such a confidential communication. (3) The censorship attaches to the communication itself and it
is immaterial that it falls into the hands of a third person. The
court thinks these reasons are well taken.
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(1) The first point is covered by a Pennsylvania statute which
states that a husband or wife shall not be competent or permitted to
testify to confidential communications made by one to the other unless the privilege be waived upon the trial. Act of May 23, 1887,
P. L. 158. This privilege of privacy of communication has been the
rule since the sixteenth century.
Counsel for the commonwealth
states that the admission of the letter is not a violation of the statute
and that the only case it covers is where either of the two is on the
stand testifying to the letter.
It is true that the wife is not upon the stand testifying to the
letter, but in Com. v. Fisher, 221 Pa. 538, letters of similar character
were not admitted at the trial. The circumstances were that prisoner
wrote letters to his wife by dictating to fellow prisoners and his
wife sent the letters to the district attorney.
The commonwealth
was not allowed to use these letters as evidence because, as the court
ruled, they were of a confidential nature between husband and wife.
(2) No one will doubt that the letter in question is such a letter as would be written between husband and wife in accordance with
the privacy given them. The letters in Com. v. Fisher, 221 Pa. 538,
were analogous to the letters in this case as they set forth facts of
the crime in each case and contained evidence material in the conviction.
(3) Why should the communication be acceptable because it
has fallen into the hands of a third party? No matter who has the
letter it will never lose its identity as a conmmunication between husband and wife. If divorce or death cannot make one competent to
testify against the other why should the fact of the wrongful taking
of the letter make it lose its identity as a confidential communication
and make it admissible in evidence?
In Com. v. Fisher, 221 Pa. 538, the letters were obtained lawfully
by the prosecuting attorney, yet the court ruled them out.
In the
present case the letters were obtained unlawfully in violation
of the prisoner's rights.
The officer, by going into the
house without a warrant, committed a trespass. Would it be fair
and just to introduce and admit evidence unlawfully obtained when
the court rules out just such evidence lawfully obtained?
The
counsel for the commonwealth holds such a contention by stating
"that the court will not take judicial notice of how evidence was
obtained." The court was not required to take judicial notice of
the fact that it was taken illegally, for the prisoner gave that in
evidence, but the court is required to take judicial notice of the
fact that there is a statute, passed May 23, 1887, P. L. 158, making it
incompetent for a wife to testify against a husband.
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Chief Justice Taylor in his opinion in Mercer v. State, 40 Fla.
216, states that though there are many authorities, holding the
doctrine that whether confidential communications between husband and wife get into the hands of third persons by fair means
or foul they are admissible as evidence, the better rule is that
such communications are still confidential letters between husband
and wife no matter how or into whose hands they fall, and this
latter is applied to this case.
New trial granted.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT
The learned court below has held that the letter put in evidence
was a confidential communication from the defendant to -his wife,
and for that reason, was inadmissible.
The act of May 23, 1887, P. L. 158, says, "Nor shall either
husband or wife be competent or permitted to testify to confidential communications made by one to the other, unless this privilege
be waived upon the trial." Not the proof of the communication,
but the proof of it by the spouse, to whom it 'was made, is forbidden.
In Com. v. Fisher, 221 Pa. 538, the court assumes that the letter of the husband, the defendant, addressed to his wife, had reached her, and had been by her given to the prosecuting officer. "The
reasonable presumption is," says Elkin, J., "that she gave them
to the prosecuting officer, which, in point of fact she did, as is
shown by facts subsequently developed." p. 544. Cf. remarks of
Mitchell, C. J., in his dissenting opinion. It might well be held
that if a wife gave the letter to the District Attorney, in order that
he might use it against the husband, she would be virtually testifying to the communication, in violation of the statute.
But, the agency of the wife in the securing by the commonwealth of the letters is excluded in this case. A police officer,
without a warrant, searched the house and there found the letters.
The wife had nothing to do with the capture of the letters. How
then can she be said to be testifying to the confidential communications ?
If a spoken communication from husband or wife to wife or
husband is overheard by a third person, he may testify to it. The
fact that the speaker has intended only his or her spouse to hear
it, does not forbid the proof of it by one who in fact overhears it.
4 Wigmore, Evidence, p. 3268; Com. v. Petrelli, 2 Westm. 1. As to
documents, Wigmore says, "If they were obtained from the addressee
by voluntary delivery, they should still be privileged (for otherwise
the privilege could by collusion be practically nullified for written
communications); but, if they were obtained surreptitiously or other-
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wise, -without the addressee's consent, the privilege should cease."
Says Wharton, Crim. Evid. Sec. 398, "A letter, also, written confidentially by husband to wife, is admissible against the husband,
when brought into court by a third party." Cf. State v. Wallace,
162 N. C. 622; 36 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cases, 423.
The search of the defendant's house without a warrant was illegal. It does not follow that no use as evidence, can be made of
the things, e. g. the letters, discovered by means of it. State v.
Flynn, 36 N. H. 64; Wigmore, Cases, p. 861; State v. Wallace,
supra.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
COMMONWEALTH v. RAILROAD CO.
Negligence-Involuntary Manslaughter-Liability of CorporationAct of March 31, 1860, Sec. 79
STATEMENT OF FACTS
By negligent operation of its train the defendant corporation
caused the death of Samuel Holmes. This is an indictment for involuntary mansalughter. Demurrer to the indictment.
Wise, for the defendant.
Miller, for the Commonwealth.
OPINION OF THE COURT
SHELLEY, J. The act under which this action is brought is
that of March 31, 1860, Sec. 79, which is in part as follows:-If
any person shall be charged -with involuntary manslaughter happening in consequence of an unlawful act, it shall and may be lawful
for the district attorney, etc.
The sole question presented by this case is, whether the word
person in the statute is broad enough to cover a corporation, or
artificial person, as well as a natural person.
The early writers and judges of the common law refused
to recognize the principle that a corporation could be punished as
it was an artificial person and, consequently, would not be amenable to the law. This idea, however, -has gradually been changed, and
at the present time a corporation can be indicted for non-feasance
and mis-feasance. Clark's Criminal Law.
It is well recognized law that an indictment will lie against
a corporation, not municipal, for the creation and maintenance of
a public nuisance. Groff's Appeal, 128 Pa. 621. That a corporation may be indicted for non-feasance or mis-feasance resulting in
nuisances and the like is well settled, but we are not aware of any
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decision that has gone the length of holding that a corporation may
be indicted for a crime involving the elements of personal violence
and criminal intent, and none has been cited. It is liable civilly
for assault and battery committed by an employe, but cannot be
indicted criminally for assault and battery or manslaughter. Coinmonwealth v. Punxsutawney St. Ry. C., 24 Pa. C. C. 25.
The Courts seem to have gotten the idea that as a corpora.
tion could not be imprisoned, it being an artificial person, it could
not, therefore, be guilty of any crime which was punished by imprisonment, and also as an artificial person, could not entertain a
criminal intent.
Certainly a corporation could not be imprisoned as such, but
this does not seem to be a logical reason why it could not be punished in some other way, as by a fine. It does not seem consistent that the corporation can be punished for civil wrongs and not
for crimes. Why could it not be held that the actions of the directors were as much those of the corporation in a criminal case as
in a civil one, and the criminal intent of the directors be imputed
to the corporation? The reason this has not been done seems to
this court to be a purely arbitrary one and not consistent with good
logic or sound reasoning.
If the corporation could be convicted of crimes involving criminal intent, the punishment of imprisonment upon which the courts
rely as a loophole, could be changed to a fine, and thus create adequate means for punishment.
As argued by the district attorney, one person may acquire
all the stock of a corporation and by so doing Tender himself irmmune to criminal prosecution. This does not seem to be justice,
but, nevertheless, it is the case and has been so determined.
It certainly seems reasonable that if a corporation were to be
punished criminally the degree of care in the selection of employes
would be a maximum degree, and, as a necessary result, would promote the public safety to a nuch greater extent than it does at
present.
Although this court is of the opinion that there is no good reason why a corporation should not be punished for crimes involving
criminal intent or personal violence, yet it does not feel free to
change the law as laid down by the various courts up to the present time.
On the authority above cited, we hold that under the present
statute on manslaughter a corporation is not within the meaning
of the word person there used, and consequently the demurrer must
be sustained.
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OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The 79th section of the act of March 31, 1860; 1 Stewart's
Purd., 965, declares, "If any person shall be charged with involuntary manslaughter, happening in consequence of an unlawful act,
it shall and may be lawful, etc ...... and such person on conviction'
shall be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding $1000, and to suffer
an imprisonment not exceeding 2 years," etc.
The statute is designed to embrace all cases of involuntary
manslaughter. The punishment it prescribes is fine and imprisonment. A corporation could be fined. It could not be imprisoned.
It is evident that whoever enacted the statute did not embrace,
under the word "persons," the artificial person called a corporation.
Since corporations act only though agents, if a negligent act
is done for a corporation by an agent, and death results, this
agent will be liable to the penalty of manslaughter. He would
not render himself "immune to criminal prosecution" even if he
had acquired "all the stock" of the corporation. However, there
are cases possibly where it would be better to make the corporation liable for the crime, by loss of its charter, or of some of its
money or property (as by fine). Until however the legislature
takes the step, the courts will probably refuse to hold a corporation
capable of committing this particular kind of crime. A corporation was held incapable of committing such a crime, in People v.
Rochester, etc. Co., 195 N. Y. 102, because the statute on the subject evidentiy did not contemplate a corporation as capable of committing it.
Cf., also, Commonwealth v. Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 152
Ky. 320; 36 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cases, 617.
Affirmed.

GILSON v. GAYLORD
Landlord and Tenantf--Lease-Condition Subsequent-Forfeiture
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Gaylord, owning a hotel, rented it for 5 years to Gilson, at a
rental of $1000 per year, the whole of which $5000 was to be paid
at once. The lease provided that if Gilson became insolvent(and his
suffering an execution to be levied on any of his property was to be
evidence of insolvency) Gaylord should have the right to re-enter.
Ten months after Gilson's entry, he became insolvent, and Gaylord at

152

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

once re-entered, despite the fact that he had received the $5000.
is an action to recover a porportional part of that sum.

This

Pifer for the plaintiff.
Prince for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ROCKMAKER, J. The determination of the ultimate question
in the case at bar, whether the tenant, Gilson, can recover a proportional part of the $5000 rent which he paid in advance for the entire
term of five years upon forfeiting the premises after an occupation
of only ten months of the ternm, upon the happening of the condition subsequent expressly stipulated in the lease, is in our opinion
determined by the application of the elementary principles of contract
law. The law governing leases is not an anomalism in the law of
contracts.
While the condition in the lease stipulated that "if Gilson became insolvent, Gaylord should have the right to re-enter," it made
no mention as to the rent which the tenant has paid in advance. The
plaintiff contends that he has a right to the proportional part of the
$5000. He claims that it is inequitable that he should be compelled
to pay rent for the 4 years and 2 months, the balance of his term,
during which time he cannot, in the slightest degree, enjoy the
The counsel for the plaintiff seems to contend on the
premises.
ground of eviction. This, however, is not so. It is a plain case of
forfeiture, and the law applicable thereto must be decisive of this
case. Were this a case of eviction, very little doubt exists in our
mind as to the decision of the case, but since this question is not
involved it is unnecessary to expound the law on this point.
The first question which arises is, what kind of conditions may
a lessor insert in his lease? Trickett on Landlord and Tenant, p.
319, says, "The lessor may make any conditions that he chooses if
they be not illegal, unreasonable or repugnant to the grant itself."
If, therefore, we find that the condition in the lease was unreasonable, illegal or inequitable we must find for the tenant; otherwise for
the landlord.
It is hornbook law to state that a contract-and a lease is no
more than that-may contain any stipulation or agreement which is
not illegal. The counsea for the plaintiff does not indicate nor can
we discern any illegality in the lease, and the lease must therefore
stand on that score.
But while the plaintiff does not question the validity or legality
of the condition, he strenuously objects to its reasonableness on
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equitable principles. This is the decisive question. Is the condition
in the lease reasonable? Is it such a condition as a court of equity,
looking at the substance and not the form of things, will sustain?
As a matter of first impression, we will admit that it does appear
rather unjust to compel a man to pay for something he does not get,
especially when he is seemingly not the culpable party. But, unfortunately for the plaintiff, first impressions do not constitute the
law in Pennsylvania. Whether or not the condition in the lease was
reasonable, we can ascertain by comparison and analogy.
"While it is sometimes said that forfeitures are not favored,
they will be enforced when the facts exist upon which tenants have
agreed that their leases shall become null and void." Hand v. Suravitz,
148 Pa. 202,
"The lease may provide that should the lessee become objectionable to the lessor for any cause the lessee shall give up the possession on 20 days notice." Adams v. Clark, 2 W. N. C. 429.
It is unnecessary for us to speculate on how many causes the
lessor may compel the tenant to move, but it will not be amiss to
make a cursory remark to the effect that although this is a very stringent condition in a lease, yet it was upheld by the court.
"The lease may simply dedlare that on the doing or omitting to
do a certain thing it shall become void." Davis v. Moss, 38 Pa. 346.
"The obligation to pay rent is not terminated because the property
has without the tenant's fault become uninhabitable or impossible of
use." Teller v. Boyle, 132 Pa. 56.
"Payment of rent in advance for the entire term, will not pre%.
vent a forfeiture." Garvey v Packett, 27 Ohio 669.
"Where a lease contains no provision on the question or provides
merely that in case the premises are destroyed during the term, the
lease or tenancy shall terminate, and there is no provision showing an
intention that in such a case a portion of the rent paid in advance
should be returned, it is generally held that no recovery of such rent
can be had." 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 540, Note.
"A lease may stipulate that if the lessee becomes "embarrassed," or makes an assignment for the benefit of creditors or is sold
out by the sheriff's sale, then the rent for the balance of the term
shall at once become due and payable, as if by the terms of the
lease it were payable in advance." Trickett on Landlord and Tenant,
p. 158.
The above citation is almost directly in point, and if the condition (supra) was held to be reasonable, we cannot see why the condition in the case at bar should not so be held. There is ultimately
no material difference between the two cases. In the case before us
the rent has already been paid and here it becomes due and payable
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as if by the terms of the lease it were payable in advance. The latter clause clearly indicates that were the rent payable in advance
in the case cited, it would have been sustained. And if this be true,
surely we must conclude that the condition in the lease before us is
reasonable. The above indicates the law on the subject.
Since it cannot be denied that often law and justice are not
synonymous terms, let us briefly consider whether the law in this
case is in accord with the common sense notion of justice. And this
we must do, for the plaintiff, although bringing this action in a
common law court, contends that he is entitled, according to the law
in our state, to the administration of equitable principles, in deciding
his case, on the theory that a court of Common Pleas, although sitting as a common law court administers equitable principles. And
he rightly so contends. Let us therefore look at the case from an
equitable point of view. In so doing we must carefully consider the
subject matter of the contract.
Were this a case involving the rental of an ordinary residence
or place of business the reasonableness and justice of the condition
in the lease would not be so apparent. But unfortunately for the
plaintiff, it is an hotel, and this, in our opinion, has a material bearnig on the question before us. Common experience tells us that the
rental of an hotel is much more difficult than that of an ordinary
home or business place. Hotels in a community are not rented every
day nor even every year. The landlord of a house worries comparatively little upon the removal of his tenant. A "for rent" sign on
the house, and it is again rented. Not so with an hotel. Very few
people in a community are prospective lessees of an hotel; the business is extremely risky; and few are the persons who are desirous of
taking such a plunge. In addition to these facts, let us assume that
the hotel has been vacant for sometime, not rented. What business
man with keen business ability will rent that hotel? Who would be
willing to take a chance on losing his fortune, whatever that may be,
by renting that hotel after seeing that the former tenant became insolvent in the attempt to manage or conduct it? Is it unreasonable
Is it unnatural for such a
for us to assume an everyday fact?
thought as this to run through the mind of a prospective tenant?"Well, I surely would like to engage in the hotel business, but if Mr.
Gilson, a man with such business ability couldn't make a success of
it, certainly it's no business investment for me. I think that I had
better look around in a different locality." Result--hotel still unrented and lessor continues to lose. Why? Simply because Mr. Gilson
failed and by his failure has given the hotel a "black eye," commercially speaking. The hotel has now acquired a reputation, and unfortunately for the landlord, a bad reputation, a reputation that it is
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a bad investment, that it's in the wrong location, that it can't draw
trade, etc.
In the light of these reasonable presumptions and every day
experiences, who can justly say that the landlord has inserted an
unreasonable condition in the lease, that he -has attempted to take advantage of his tenant by stipulating that upon his becoming insolvent, he forfeits the premises and the rent which he paid in advance?
What court of equity will censure a business man because he justly
and reasonably applies the first law of nature-the law of self preservation-in his business deaings?
In concluding we might add that the plaintiff entered into the
contract with his eyes open. He alleges no fraud, accident or mistake and since he bound himself to the condition in the lease, we think
he has no legal or just grounds of complaint.
From the above authority and reasoning we are constrained to
decide that Gilson, the lessee has no legal, reasonable or equitable
right to the proportionate share of the $5000 and we therefore, render
judgment for the defendant.
Judgment for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
It is held in both England and the United States that a provision
that the landlord shall have the right to enter and terminate the lease
upon the insolvency of the tenant is valid and enforcible. 1 Tiffany
on Landlord and Tenant, 1179. Galbraith v. Wood, 124 Minn. 210. The
utility and propriety of this doctrine as applied to the facts of the
present case is clearly demonstrated by the opinion of the learned
court below.
The lease having been legally terminated by the landlord he was
entitled to retain the whole of the rent which, in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, had been paid in advance. "In case rent
has been paid in advance under a stipulation that it shall be so paid,
and the landlord re-enters for conditions broken, the landlord is entitled to retain the rent so paid, though the entry is before the expiration of the period for which the rent was paid." Hepp Wall Paper
Co. v. Deahl, 53 Colo. 274; 125 Pac. 491.
To the same effect are
Evans v. McClure, 108 Ark. 531; 158 S. W. 487; Carter v. Wing Chong,
12 Hawaii 291; Forgotsen v. Brafman, 84 N. Y. S. 237; Galbraith v. Wood, 124 Minn. 216; 144 N. W. 945" 18 A. & E. Encyc.,
302; 1 Tiffany on Landlord and Tenant 1179.
Judgment affirmed.

DICKINSON

LAW REVIEW

HOLMES v. JESSUP
Lease-Exclusion From Possession by Lessor-Measure of Damages
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Jessup, by parol, on July 7th, 1914, let a house to Buckingham
for two and a half years, beginning August 1, 1914, for the rent of
$300 per year, to be prepaid, and Buckingham paid Jessup $750 on
July 18, 1914. The next day he assigned his interest to Holmhes for
$1000, which Holmes immediately paid. When August first arrived,
Jessup notified Holmes that he did not recognize any right in him,
and he refused to permit Holmes to enter. This is a suit for damages, which are claimed to be equal to $1000, the price paid by Holmes
to Buckingham. Jessup denies the right of Holmes to sue, and further alleges that were there such right, only damages actually proved
could be recovered, in no case more than $750.
OPINION OF THE COURT
WALLACE, J. There is no doubt that the parol lease in question is valid. Being for a term of less than three years, it is without
the Act of 1772, and is as binding as if it had been in writing.
The next question is whether or not the assignment of the term
by the lessee to the plaintiff is valid. "In the absence of an express
restriction either by contract or by statute, the right of the tenant
to assign his leasehold estate is incident to every tenancy either for
life, for years, or from year to year." 13 A. & E. Enc. of Law (2nd
ed.) 659.
This being so, and there being nothing in the lease restrictive
the
rights of the lessee to assign, the assignability of the term
of
after entry, and of the interest of the lessee before entry logically
follow. Whether the term is to commence immediately or at a future date, the interesse termini at once vests in the lessee upon execution of the lease, and is assignable. Davis v. Partel, 56 Superior
557.
Whether the assignment was in writing or by parol is immaterial. Trickett's "Landlord and Tenant," 367.
Applying these principles to the facts of the case, the conclusion
follows that the assignee, the plaintiff, acquired by the assignment
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the interest that had been granted to the lessee, and this right or interest, thus vested in him, entitles him to maintain an action in his
own name to recover damages from the lessor, the defendant, for
refusing to admit him to the possession.
The measure of damages is the rental value of the premises.
Wood v. Sharpless, 174 Pa. 588; McClowry v. -Croghan's Adm., 1
Grant 307. In Riley v. Hale, 158 Mass. 240, the measure of damages was held to be "the rent reserved in the lease, to which should
be added such sum as the jury should find the rental value to be over
the amount reserved in the lease." In Davis v. Hartel, 56 Superior
Court 557, the rent for the term was paid in advance; evidence was
admitted as to the rental value of the lease, and recovery allowed in
that amount. The Superior Court in that case said, "Indeed we know
of no other measure of damages that would have compensated the
plaintiff for the loss sustained by the defendant's refusal to admit
him into possession."
The rental value is a question of fact for the jury. We therefore find for the plaintiff in that amount.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The instruction given to the jury by the learned and somewhat
otiose court below, on the subject of damages was inadequate. The
plaintiff contended that he should recover $1000, the price paid for
the leasehold. The defendant contends that the damages could not
exceed $750, the rental paid by the lessee from whom the plaintiff derived his title. No clear instruction on this vital question was given,
probably because the learned court found nothing upon it in Davis
v. Hartel, 56 Super. 557.
The possession of the premises had a value, of which the plaintiff was deprived.
He should therefore receive a sum of money
equal to this value.
The price of the possession, $750, paid by Buckingham to Jessup, and received by the latter, might, as between theni be taken as
prima facie evidence of the actual value of it. We think it might be
taken as such evidence, even between Holmes and Jessup as against
Jessup. We know no principle which would justify the reception of
the price paid by Holmes to Buckingham as evidence to affect Jessup.
The ordinary measure of damages for the lessee's exclusion
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from possession is the amount by which the rental value of the premises exceeds the rent agreed to be paid, (1 Tiffany, Landlord and Tenant, 547,) in cases where the rent has not been paid, and the possession under the lease has a value in excess of the rent. What is the
market value of the right of possession, is the question. If the rent
has been paid, as in the case before us, no reduction will need to be
made for the rent. If it has not been paid, the value of the possession minus the rent which the lessee would have had to pay, in order
to entitle himself to the possession will be the amount which he will
be entitled to receive, if he is prevented from taking possession.
As the rent paid by Buckingham is prima facie (no other evidence
being given) the value of the possession for three years, this amount
only could be recovered.
The defendant might have reduced the
amount recoverable, by showing that the rent was unduly high; not
representing the market value of the possession. The plaintiff might
have shown that the rental reserved and paid was less than the market value of the possession, but, since he cannot use as evidence on
this point, his payment of $1000 to Buckingham, and since he has
given no other evidence of the value of the lease, he cannot recover
on the evidence submitted, more than $750.
As the jury were not adequately instructed, the judgment is reversed, with v. f. d. n.

